Was Uzbekistan Ever Part of China?

乌兹别克斯坦历史上属于中国吗？——河中之地与中原王朝的千年政治边界考

"The map of empire is drawn not only by swords, but by the grammar of sovereignty."

帝国的地图不只由刀剑绘成，也由主权的语法写就。

Prologue: The Question That Sounds Simple

引子：一个看似简单的问题

Ask a casual reader of history and the answer comes fast: "Wasn't Samarkand once Tang China?" Ask a diplomat from Tashkent and the answer is a smile. The truth sits between them—not in the middle, but in the difference between belonging and being connected.

如果把问题抛给历史爱好者，答案往往很爽快："撒马尔罕不是唐朝的吗？"如果问塔什干的外交官，回你的是微笑。真相落在两者之间——但不是中间值，而是"归属"与"联系"这两个概念的距离。

Uzbekistan, as a sovereign republic, never was a province of any Chinese dynasty. But the land it stands on—Transoxiana (河中地区), the oasis arc of Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent, Ferghana—entered the Tang imperial system for roughly ninety years as jimi (羁縻, "bridled-and-tamed") jurisdictions. That is a real historical fact, and also a frequently abused one.

乌兹别克斯坦作为主权共和国，从未是任何中国王朝的直辖省区。但它脚下的土地——河中地区，撒马尔罕、布哈拉、塔什干、费尔干纳的绿洲弧带——曾在约九十年里以"羁縻"身份进入唐朝体系。这是硬事实，也是被频繁滥用的硬事实。

I. Before the Tang: A Crossroads That Belonged to Everyone and No One

一、唐以前：属于所有人、也不属于任何人的十字路口

The territory of modern Uzbekistan is the western half of Transoxiana, bounded by the Amu Darya (Oxus) and Syr Darya (Jaxartes). Long before any Chinese envoy arrived, it had been cycled through by:

今乌兹别克斯坦主体即河中地区西半部，夹在阿姆河与锡尔河之间。在汉使到来前，它已被这样一些力量轮流碾过：

• Achaemenid Persia​ (as Sogdiana)
• Alexander's Hellenistic empires​ (Maracanda = Samarkand)
• Greco-Bactrian and Kushan​ states
• Sassanian Persia, Hephthalites (嚈哒)
• Western Turkic Khaganate​ (西突厥, 6th–7th c.)

Han Dynasty records name the region Dawan (大宛, Ferghana)​ and Kangju (康居, Sogdiana). Zhang Qian reached them; the Han set up the Western Regions Protectorate (西域都护府)​ in 60 BCE—but its writ stopped east of the Pamirs. Dawan and Kangju were neighbors, not subjects.​

西汉称这里为大宛（费尔干纳）与康居（索格底亚那）。张骞抵达；汉设西域都护府（公元前60年），但权力止步葱岭以东。大宛、康居是邻国，不是属县。

II. The Tang Moment: 657–751, the Only Time It "Entered China"

二、唐朝时刻：657–751，唯一一次"进入中国"

In 657 CE, Tang general Su Dingfang crushed the Western Turks. The Tang court extended the Anxi Protectorate (安西都护府)​ westward and, between 661–663, accepted the submission of the "Sixteen States of Transoxiana (河中十六国)." On paper, Tang established 16 jimi military governorships (都督府) and 80 jimi prefectures​ across the Oxus–Jaxartes belt.

657年，唐将苏定方灭西突厥。唐廷把安西都护府向西延伸，661–663年间接受"河中十六国"归附。名义上，唐在阿姆—锡尔河之间设16个羁縻都督府、80个羁縻州。

What this meant in practice:

这套体系实际意味着什么：

• The king of Samarkand (Kangguo / 康国)​ was appointed Commandant of Kangju (康居都督), kept his throne, his tax base, his religion.
• The king of Ferghana (拔汗那 / 宁远国)​ received Tang investiture; in 744 he was granted the surname Dou (窦)​ and a Tang princess (和义公主) in marriage.
• These rulers issued no coin in Tang script, levied no Tang tax, housed no Tang magistrate. They sent tribute, accepted titles, and were expected not to rebel.
• 撒马尔罕王（康国）受任"康居都督"，王位、税基、宗教全留。
• 费尔干纳王（拔汗那/宁远国）受唐册封；744年获赐姓窦，尚和义公主。
• 这些王不铸唐钱、不缴唐税、不驻唐官。只进贡、受爵、不叛。

This is the jimi system (羁縻制度)—indirect suzerainty, not direct administration. The Tang center called these places nei shu (内属, "internally attached"); modern political science calls it tributary autonomy. Compare: Tang ran Guanzhong like a county; it ran Samarkand like a vassal podcast host—famous, flattered, but not on the payroll.

这就是羁縻制度——间接宗主权，非直接行政。唐称"内属"，现代政治学叫朝贡式自治。类比：唐管关中是郡县，管撒马尔罕像管一个藩属主播——有名、有赏，但不发工资。

The window closed fast:

• 751 Talas Battle (怛罗斯之战): Tang forces defeated by Abbasid Arabs; the jimi chain in Transoxiana loosened.
• 755 An Lushan Rebellion (安史之乱): the Tang pulled every available soldier east. By 763, the Anxi Protectorate's effective reach retreated behind the Pamirs. Samarkand and Bukhara slid into the Caliphate's orbit.

窗口关得很快：

• 751年怛罗斯之战：唐军败于阿拔斯阿拉伯，河中羁縻链松动。
• 755年安史之乱：唐把兵全调回东方。至763年，安西都护府实际辖区退到葱岭以东。撒马尔罕、布哈拉滑入哈里发轨道。

So the honest timeline: 657–751 (or 755 at most) = ~94 years of Tang jimi presence in eastern/western Transoxiana oases; never full territorial sovereignty; never including all of modern Uzbekistan (Khwarazm/western Uzbekistan was outside even that).​

所以老实时间线：657–751（最宽算到755）= 约94年唐在河中东部/西部绿洲的羁縻存在；从未是完整领土主权；从未覆盖今乌全境（花剌子模/乌西部连这都不算）。

III. Yuan, Ming, Qing: Suzerainty, Not Sovereignty

三、元明清：宗藩，不是主权

• Mongol Empire / Yuan: In the 1220s Chinggisid armies destroyed the Khwarazmshah state; Transoxiana fell under the Chagatai Khanate. Chagatai was a Mongol appanage, nominally under the Great Khan, later independent. The Yuan court in Dadu never administered Samarkand directly—it received envoys, not tax rolls. Not Yuan territory; a related khanate.
• Timurid era (14th–15th c.): Timur made Samarkand his capital, exchanged missions with Ming. The Ming court listed him as a "vassal who styled himself subject (称臣)"—diplomatic fiction, not jurisdiction.
• Qing: The Qing frontier stopped at Ili and the Pamirs. The Khanate of Kokand (浩罕)​ in Ferghana was a tributary neighbor; the Qing never garrisoned Tashkent or Bukhara.
• 蒙古/元：1220年代灭花剌子模，河中归察合台汗国。察合台是蒙古封地，初隶大汗，后独立。大都元廷不直接治撒马尔罕——收使节，不收税册。非元土，是同源宗藩汗国。
• 帖木儿时代（14–15世纪）：帖木儿都撒马尔罕，与明通使。明廷记其"称臣"——外交修辞，非管辖。
• 清：边界止步伊犁、帕米尔。浩罕汗国是朝贡邻国；清不驻军塔什干、布哈拉。

IV. The Modern Closure: From Russian Empire to the 1991 Republic

四、现代的闭合：从沙俄到1991年共和国

The 19th century ended the ambiguity. Russia annexed Kokand (1876), reduced Bukhara and Khiva to protectorates. In 1924 the Soviet state drew nationalities on a map and carved out the Uzbek SSR. On 31 August 1991, the Republic of Uzbekistan​ declared independence.

19世纪终结了模糊。俄国吞浩罕（1876），布哈拉、希瓦降为保护国。1924年苏联按民族划界，切出乌兹别克苏维埃社会主义共和国。1991年8月31日，乌兹别克斯坦共和国独立。

No Chinese claim, no Chinese memory in law. The Tang jimi files in the Old Tang History are archive, not title deed.

没有中国主张，也没有法律里的中国记忆。《旧唐书》里的羁縻档案是文献，不是地契。

V. Why the Confusion Persists — Three Semantic Traps

五、为什么混淆不停——三个语义陷阱

Trap 1: "Tributary = Territory."

朝贡 = 领土。错。唐册封流鬼、日本、泥婆罗皆授官，没人说东京或加德满都曾属长安。

Trap 2: "The Silk Road was Chinese, so its stations were Chinese."

丝路是中国的，所以驿站是中国的。错。罗马大道不使罗马拥有高卢每个酒馆。

Trap 3: "Jimi = province."

羁縻 = 郡县。错。羁縻是"以夷制夷"的成本节约型宗主权；对比唐宋对西南土司、明清对蒙古盟旗，同一语法。

Belonging in the pre-modern world was graded, not binary. To flatten jimi into "province" is to mistake a cousin for a son.

前现代世界的"归属"是光谱，不是开关。把羁縻压平为"省"，是把堂兄认成亲儿子。

VI. Political Meaning Today

六、今天的政冶含义

For Beijing, the Tang-jimi memory is cultural capital, not territorial claim. The "Chinese dream" narrative uses Samarkand as proof of civilizational reach—not as casus belli. For Tashkent, claiming "we were never China" is unnecessary because no one officially claims otherwise; the stronger current is Silk Road diplomacy: rail links, SCO meetings, Xi's 2022 visit to Samarkand, Mirziyoyev's pivot to multi-vector foreign policy.

对北京，唐朝羁縻记忆是文化资本，不是领土主张。"中国梦"叙事用撒马尔罕证明文明辐射力——不是开战理由。对塔什干，"我们从未属华"无需声明，因无人正式主张；更强的水流是丝路外交：铁路、上合、2022年习访撒马尔罕、米尔济约耶夫多向量外交。

The honest sentence for textbooks:

教科书里那句老实话应该是：

Uzbekistan's core lands were inside the Tang jimi network for under a century (657–751), never as direct Chinese territory, and never again thereafter. Connection, yes; incorporation, no.

乌兹别克斯坦核心区在唐朝羁縻网内不到百年（657–751），从未作中国直辖领土，此后不再。有联系，无并入。

Coda

尾声

History is not a property registry. When we ask "did X belong to Y," we usually mean "who gets to speak for the past." The Tang generals who erected a stele near Talas would have said Samarkand was their barbarian cousin. The Sogdian merchant loading silk at Chang'an would have said the opposite. Both were right, because sovereignty then was a verb, not a border.

历史不是房产证。当我们问"X属不属于Y"，多半是在问"谁有权代表过去说话"。在怛罗斯立碑的唐将会说撒马尔罕是"自家蕃胡"；在长安装丝的粟特商会说正相反。都对，因为那时的主权是动词，不是界线。

Uzbekistan belongs to the Uzbeks. The Tang belongs to the archive. The road between them still runs.

乌兹别克斯坦属于乌兹别克人。唐朝属于档案馆。两者之间那条路，还在跑车。

*References anchored to: Old/New Tang History 羁縻都督府 entries; Anxi Protectorate jurisdiction (657–751); Chagatai Khanate status; Russian conquest 1860s–1876; USSR delimitation 1924; Uzbek independence 1991. *

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