
From Bipolarity to Warring States: The Risk of Global Disorder Amidst Concurrent Regional Wars
从两极到战国:双线热战背景下的全球失序风险与新型世界格局研判
Institute for Global Strategic Foresight (IGSF) | 全球战略前瞻研究院
Date: July 20, 2026
1. Executive Summary | 核心提要
As the Russia-Ukraine war grinds into its fifth year and the US-Iran conflict escalates into a protracted multi-domain confrontation in 2026, the global order is teetering on the edge of a structural phase transition. The simultaneous eruption of two major regional wars, backed by rival great powers, mirrors the “Warring States Period” (战国时代) of ancient China—characterized by the collapse of a unifying authority (the post-WWII liberal order), fluid coalitional alignments, and the normalization of high-intensity conflict.
俄乌冲突步入第五年,美伊战事在2026年升级为持久的多域对抗,全球秩序正站在结构性相变的悬崖边缘。两场由对立大国分别背书的主要区域战争同时爆发,酷似中国古代的“战国时代”——其特征包括统一权威(二战后自由主义国际秩序)的崩塌、联盟关系的流动重组,以及高强度冲突的常态化。
This paper argues that while a full-scale nuclear holocaust is restrained by mutual assured destruction, the world is entering a “Neo-Warring States” era: a fragmented, multi-polar battlefield where conventional wars, hybrid threats, and economic weaponization replace diplomatic consensus.
本文认为,尽管“相互保证毁灭”抑制了全面核浩劫,但世界正步入“新战国时代”:一个碎片化的多极战场,常规战争、混合威胁与经济武器化取代了外交共识。
2. The Collapse of the Pax Americana & Institutional Decay | 美式和平的瓦解与制度性衰变
2.1 The Fading Hegemon (衰退的霸权)
The post-1945 order, anchored by US unipolarity, is undergoing systemic fracture. The inability of the US to swiftly resolve the Iran conflict despite technological superiority, coupled with the stalemate in Ukraine, signals the arrival of the “Kindleberger Trap”—where the declining hegemon can no longer provide global public goods nor prevent systemic collapse.
1945年以来以美国单极为锚的全球秩序正经历系统性断裂。美国虽具技术优势却无法在伊朗冲突中速胜,加之乌克兰僵局,标志着“金德尔伯格陷阱”的到来——衰退的霸权既无法供给全球公共产品,亦无力阻止体系崩塌。
“The institutions that once underpinned global order are struggling to adapt; the result is an order that is not collapsing but being rewired—more fragmented, yet still deeply interconnected.”
—— JPMorgan Chase Center for Geopolitics, World Rewired, 2025
2.2 The Warring States Analogy (战国类比的逻辑)
In the Eastern Zhou’s Warring States era, the Zhou king lost the Mandate of Heaven (天命), and seven powerful states engaged in vertical and horizontal alliances (合纵连横). Today:
东周战国时代,周天子丧失“天命”,七雄展开合纵连横。当今亦然:
-
UN/Security Council → The impotent Zhou court (丧失仲裁力的周室)
-
US, China, Russia, EU, UK, Iran, India → The modern Qi, Chu, Yan, Han, Zhao, Wei, Qin (当代七雄)
-
BRICS+/SCO vs G7 → Competing normative blocs (竞争性规范集团)
Raymond Aron’s concept of “Guerres en chaîne” (连锁战争) is resurfacing: local conflicts no longer remain confined but converge into a single strategic crisis.
3. Conflict Interconnectivity: The Two-War Problem | 冲突互联:“两线作战”困境
3.1 Resource Dilution & Opportunistic Aggression
The “Two-War Problem” traditionally referred to US planning for simultaneous conflicts in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Today, it manifests as US-Russia/Europe in Ukraine + US-Israel/Iran in the Middle East. This dilution of focus creates windows for opportunistic revisionism:
传统“两线作战”指美军在欧太同时备战,如今实化为俄乌线(美俄/欧)与中东线(美以/伊)。注意力稀释催生机会主义修正主义:
-
Russia leverages energy windfalls from Hormuz disruptions to sustain its Ukrainian front.
俄罗斯利用霍尔木兹中断带来的能源溢价维持乌克兰战线。
-
Iran acquires advanced drone/SAM tech from Russia, extending the conflict’s longevity.
伊朗获俄制高端无人机/防空技术,延长冲突周期。
3.2 The Erosion of Conflict Confinement
During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence confined hot wars to peripheral theaters. In 2026, conflict containment is failing. The US-Israel-Iran war directly impacts Russia-Ukraine peace negotiations by diverting global diplomatic bandwidth and hardening bloc mentalities.
冷战时期核威慑将热战限制在边缘剧场;2026年冲突围堵机制失效。美以伊战争通过分流全球外交带宽与固化集团心态,直接迟滞俄乌和谈。
4. Characteristics of the Neo-Warring States Era | 新战国时代的特质
|
Dimension 维度 |
Cold War 冷战 |
Neo-Warring States 新战国时代 |
|---|---|---|
|
Deterrence 威慑 |
Nuclear taboos & stable MAD 核禁忌与稳定互毁 |
Gray-zone erosion, limited nuclear war considered “feasible” 灰色地带侵蚀,有限核战被视为“可行” |
|
Alliances 同盟 |
Ideological blocs (NATO/Warsaw) 意识形态集团 |
Transactional alignment (e.g., Russia-Iran-DPRK vs US-GCC-Israel) 交易性结盟 |
|
Economy 经济 |
Interdependence 相互依存 |
Weaponized interdependence (sanctions, supply-chain decoupling) 武器化相互依存(制裁、断链) |
|
Tech 技术 |
Dual-use nascent 双用萌芽 |
AI-militarized swarm warfare, democratized precision strike AI军事化集群战,精确打击民主化 |
The defining feature is “Multi-Speed Fragmentation”: trade, tech, and security now operate on disparate clocks, making agility the primary strategic currency.
5. Guardrails: Why Total War Remains Unlikely (For Now) | 护栏:为何总体战暂难爆发
Despite the Warring States analogy, three factors differentiate 2026 from 230 BCE:
虽有战国类比,三者令2026迥异于公元前230年:
-
Existential Nuclear Threshold: Unlike ancient states, modern great powers face extinction. Deterrence, though fraying, still imposes restraint.
生存性核门槛:现代大国面临灭绝风险,威慑虽磨损仍具克制力。
-
Economic Entanglement: Even adversarial states retain residual financial linkages (e.g., energy payments via third parties), preventing clean decoupling.
经济缠绕:即便敌对国仍存残余金融链路(如第三方能源结算),难彻底脱钩。
-
Global South Autonomy: India, Gulf states, ASEAN practice “selective non-alignment”, refusing to be mere vassals of the Qin or Chu (US or China), thus dampening bloc-to-bloc escalation.
全球南方自主性:印、海湾、东盟奉行“选择性不结盟”,拒做秦楚(美中)附庸,缓冲集团对撞。
6. Strategic Outlook & Recommendations | 战略展望与建议
6.1 Trajectory (路径预判)
-
Baseline (60%): Protracted “Nested Wars” (嵌套战争)—Ukraine and Iran remain simmering fronts within a global competitive framework, resembling the Zhanguo stalemate pre-Qin unification.
基准情景(60%):持久“嵌套战争”——俄乌与伊朗作为全球竞合框架下的焖烧前线,类战国秦统一前僵局。
-
Pessimistic (30%): Escalatory Convergence—a trigger event (e.g., NATO Article 5 invoked, Strait of Hormuz blockade) fuses the two theaters into a systemic great-power war.
悲观情景(30%):升级性融合——触发事件(如北约第五条启动、霍尔木兹封锁)将两剧场熔为体系性大国战争。
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Optimistic (10%): Exhaustion-induced Settlement—war weariness and fiscal strain force a Chanyuan-style (澶渊) grand bargain among blocs.
乐观情景(10%):衰竭性和解——战争厌倦与财政压力倒逼集团间达成“澶渊式”大交易。
6.2 Policy Imperatives (政策要务)
-
Rebuild Crisis Communication: Establish a dedicated US-Russia-China hotline on nuclear/energy red lines.
重建危机沟通:设立美俄中核/能源红线专用热线。
-
Institutional Patchwork: Accept a “Composite Multi-Layer Order” where issue-specific regimes (climate, AI, finance) coexist with rival security blocs.
制度补丁化:接受“复合多层秩序”,议题性机制(气候、AI、金融)与对立安全集团共存。
-
Global South Mediation: Empower the BRICS+ / GCC as honest brokers to prevent total bifurcation.
全球南方调停:赋权金砖+/海湾国家为诚实中介,防彻底两极化。
7. Conclusion | 结语
The world is not yet in a total Warring States free-for-all, but the logic of the Warring States—where trust is a scarce commodity, power is fragmented, and war is a recurrent instrument of policy—has returned with a vengeance. The challenge of this era is not merely to manage the fires in Ukraine or the Persian Gulf, but to rewire the guardrails before the system snaps entirely.
世界尚未陷入彻底的战国混战,但战国逻辑——信任稀缺、权力碎裂、战争沦为常态政策工具——已凶猛回归。当今时代的挑战不仅是扑灭乌克兰或波斯湾的烽火,更要在体系彻底断裂前重接护栏。
“Peace is not the absence of war, but the presence of sufficient restraint.”
“和平非无战,乃有足够之克制存焉。”
Disclaimer: This article is a simulated think tank analysis for geopolitical discussion purposes.
免责声明: 本文为模拟智库分析,仅供地缘战略讨论之用。
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